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Abstract—Smart contracts are executable programs that en-
able the building of a programmable trust mechanism between
multiple entities without the need of a trusted third-party. At the
time of this writing, there were over 10 million smart contracts
deployed on the Ethereum networks and this number continues
to grow at a rapid pace. Smart contracts are often written in a
Turing-complete programming language called Solidity, which is
not easy to audit for subtle errors. Further, since smart contracts
are immutable, errors have led to attacks resulting in losses of
cryptocurrency worth 100s of millions of USD and reputational
damage. Unfortunately, manual security analyses do not scale
with size and number of smart contracts. Automated and scalable
mechanisms are essential if smart contracts are to gain main-
stream acceptance. Researchers have developed several security
scanners in the past couple of years. However, many of these
analyzer either do not scale well, or if they do, produce many false
positives. This issue is exacerbated when bugs are triggered only
after a series of interactions with the functions of the contract-
under-test. A depth-n vulnerability, refers to a vulnerability that
requires invoking a specific sequence of n functions to trigger.
Depth-n vulnerabilities are time-consuming to detect by existing
automated analyzers, because of the combinatorial explosion of
sequences of functions that could be executed on smart contracts.
In this paper, we present a technique to analyze depth-n
vulnerabilities in an efficient and scalable way by combining
symbolic execution and data dependency analysis. A significant
advantage of combining symbolic with static analysis is that it
scales much better than symbolic alone and does not have the
problem of false positive that static analysis tools typically have.
We have implemented our technique in a tool called MPro, a
scalable and automated smart contract analyzer based on the
existing symbolic analysis tool Mythril-Classic and the static
analysis tool Slither. We analyzed 100 randomly chosen smart
contracts on MPro and our evaluation shows that MPro is
about n-times faster than Mythril-Classic for detecting depth-
n vulnerabilities, while preserving all the detection capabilities
of Mythril-Classic.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Smart Contract, Symbolic Execu-
tion, Static Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ethereum Blockchain, with a capitalization of 14.8
billion USD [1] and more than 59 million existing accounts
[2], is one of the leading platforms for smart contracts.
Unfortunately, smart contracts remain vulnerable to various
security attacks. Several attacks have been observed in the
past few years like the DAO attack in 2016, which resulted
in the theft of 60 million USD worth of Ether [3]. The Parity
Wallet attack in 2017 led to losses of over 30 million USD
due to improper access control of a sensitive function, which
could be called through a publicly accessible function [4].
Another highly publicized attack was a batch overflow attack
in 2018, which led to the creation of very large amounts of
several different crypto-currency tokens [5]. This attack caused
reputation damage for the affected crypto-currency projects as
well as for Ethreum as seen by the drop of 8% in the ETH
value on the day this attack was announced.
Symbolic execution [6] is a promising technique adopted
widely in smart contract analyzers, which tries to explore all
possible program execution paths and uses constraint solvers
to calculate a concrete input (test case) for each feasible
path. However, as the possible program states and paths grow
exponentially with the number of branches in the program,
the scalability of this technique is often inhibited due to
the path explosion [9] issue. Nevertheless, the often limited
size of smart contracts is a blessing, which allows symbolic
execution to be highly applicable in this domain, as opposed
to the domain of classical software systems, where real-world
software nowadays has millions of lines of code.
One of the most popular security scanners for smart con-
tracts, Mythril-Classic [7], uses symbolic execution at its
core. It is one of the most comprehensive and powerful tools
among all the existing symbolic analyzers, which models the
Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [8] to a high degree of
accuracy and supports a wide range of security checks.
Another issue that current security scanners (including
Mythril-Classic) face is the combinatorial explosion of dif-
ferent possible function call sequences of arbitrary lengths in
smart contract interactions. Depth-n vulnerabilities in smart
contract was first presented in [10] as trace vulnerabilities,
which refers to the vulnerability that cannot be triggered in
a single function invocation. To detect depth-n vulnerabilities,
Mythril-Classic currently uses brute force (with a basic path
pruning strategy) to execute all possible sequences of function
calls up to the maximum call depth, which often leads to
combinatorial explosion. Our experiment of 100 smart con-
tracts presented in Section IV, shows that 34% of the test
cases contain depth-n vulnerabilities. The overall runtimes of
Mythril-Classic at depth 2 and depth 3 are 3.43x and 14.04x
longer than the overall execution time at depth 1. This result
highlights the importance to optimize the symbolic execution
engine of Mythril-Classic at deeper depths.
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In this paper, we present an optimization technique for de-
tecting depth-n vulnerabilities based on data dependency anal-
ysis and we integrate it with Mythril-Classic. By leveraging
data dependency analysis, unnecessary sequences of function
invocations can be pruned during the analysis. Function call
sequences that are more likely to lead to depth-n vulnerabilities
are prioritized (and therefore depth-n vulnerabilities can be de-
tected in an early stage), based on the read/write dependencies
of state variables in every externally accessible function of the
smart contract.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1) An optimization based on data-dependency analysis,
to the problem of finding depth-n vulnerabilities via
symbolic execution.
2) An open-source implementation of this optimization
approach based on Mythril-Classic, called MPro1.
3) An evaluation of this approach using MPro and a dataset
of 100 real-world smart contracts.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way.
Section II presents background knowledge necessary to un-
derstand the rest of this paper. Section III describes the
design of our optimization approach and the implementaiton
of MPro. Section IV presents the setup and results of our
evaluation of MPro. Section V describes the limitations of
our implementation. Section VI presents related work and
compares it to MPro. The conclusions and future work are
presented in section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Ethereum and Smart Contracts
A smart contract, in essence, is a program stored on the
Ethereum blockchain and is identified by a unique contract
address. The Ethereum blockchain is maintained and updated
by many nodes connected in a peer-to-peer manner to the
Ethereum network. Each node on the Ethereum network runs
the EVM. Users can interact with the Ethereum network in
order to: (i) create new contracts; (ii) invoke functions of a
contract; (iii) transfer the cryptocurrency Ether (ETH) to other
contracts or users. A function invocation to a smart contract is
recorded inside a transaction. The Ethereum blockchain can
also be described as a transaction-based state machine, where
the sequence of transactions on the blockchain determines the
state of each smart contract and the balance of each user [12].
Each smart contract contains its private storage, a predefined
executable bytecode and may control some Ether. When a user
invokes a function of a smart contract, the EVM [8], executes
the bytecode corresponding to that function, which is often
compiled from Turing-complete programming languages like
Solidity or Vyper. The following section presents different
types of vulnerabilities that arise due to the complexity of
these programming languages and the underlying program-
ming paradigm.
1https://github.com/QuanZhang-William/M-Pro
1 contract Caller {
2 mapping (address => uint) public balance;
3
4 function withdraw(uint amount) public{
5 if (balance[msg.sender] >= amount){
6 require(msg.sender.call.value(amount)());
7 balance[msg.sender]-=amount;
8 }
9 }
10
11 function withdrawFixed(uint amount) public{
12 if (balance[msg.sender] >= amount){
13 balance[msg.sender]-=amount;
14 require(msg.sender.call.value(amount)());
15 }
16 }
17 }
Fig. 1. Ethereum smart contract vulnerable to reentrancy attacks
B. Smart Contract Security
Different from traditional software programs, a smart con-
tract is publicly accessible, transparent and immutable. This
leads to situations where bugs, including security issues, are
visible and exploitable by attackers. Attackers are highly
incentivized to exploit such vulnerabilities for their own ben-
efit as smart contracts often hold some amount of crypto-
currency. In this section, we specifically describe two types
of vulnerabilities that can be detected by MPro (and Mythril-
Classic). A complete list of detection capabilities of Mythril-
Classic and MPro can be found in [7].
a) Reentrancy: This is a well-known vulnerability resid-
ing in smart contracts as it resulted in the DAO attack in 2016
[3]. Figure 1 shows a simple smart contract that is vulnerable
to reentrancy.
In Solidity, a smart contract can invoke a function from
another smart contract using the call instruction and such
calls are synchronous. In other words, the caller smart contract
always waits for the callee contract to finish before executing
the next line of code. The purpose of the withdraw function
(line 4 in Figure 1) is to send out a specific amount of Ether
to an external account (withdrawer) iff the withdrawer has
enough credit stored in the current contract, indicated by the
global variable balance. The balance of the withdrawer is
updated after sending Ether out (line 7 in Figure 1).
A potential reentrancy attack can happen at line 6. The
external contract being called on line 6 can simply call back
to the withdraw function of the caller contract again. Note that
the state variable balance is not yet updated at this point of
time because the caller contract is still waiting for the external
call to finish. Therefore, in the case of a reentrancy attack, the
true branch on line 5 will be executed again and again, hence
all the Ether stored in the caller contract can be drained out
after a couple iterations.
One of the simplest way to prevent such attack is to call an
external function only after all the persistent storage updates
are done [13]. Thus, to fix this vulnerability, the balance state
variable needs to be updated before executing the external
call (as indicated in the withdrawerFixed function starting
on line 11). Since invoking a single function is sufficient
1 contract Suicide {
2 address public owner;
3
4 modifier onlyOwner{
5 if(msg.sender != owner) revert();
6 _;
7 }
8
9 function setOwner() public{
10 owner = msg.sender;
11 }
12
13 function kill(address addr) public onlyOwner{
14 selfdestruct(msg.sender);
15 }
16 }
Fig. 2. A smart contract with unrestricted suicide vulnerability
to trigger this specific vulnerability, we classify this specific
reentrancy vulnerability as a depth-1 vulnerability. However,
it is important to note that not all reentrancy vulnerabilities
are depth-1 vulnerabilities.
b) Unrestricted Suicide Vulnerability: A smart contract
remains alive on the Ethereum blockchain until it gets killed by
the contract owner or other authorized agents by invoking the
selfdestruct instruction in Solidity. However, arbitrarily
killing a smart contract can result in Ether lock or unexpected
Ether flow, and therefore the selfdestruct instruction should
always be protected from being invoked by any arbitrary caller
of the smart contract.
Figure 2 shows a simple smart contract that can be destroyed
by any arbitrary caller. In this example, the kill function on
line 13 is protected by the onlyOwner modifier (defined on
line 4), which only allows the smart contract owner (stored in
the owner field) to access the function. However, any arbitrary
caller can become the owner by simply calling the setOwner
function(which is not protected).
To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker merely needs to
invoke the setOwner function (on line 9 of Figure 2) to become
the owner of the contract and then kill the contract by calling
the kill function. This vulnerability was discovered in the
Parity wallet in 2017 and it caused losses of 30 million USD
worth of Ether [4], [14]. In this paper, we call vulnerabilities
that require a specific function invocation sequences to trigger
as depth-n vulnerability, where n is the minimal number
of function calls required to trigger the vulnerability. Thus,
the unrestricted suicide issue in this example is a depth-2
vulnerability. It is worth mentioning that this vulnerability is
only detected by MPro (and Mythril-Classic) at transaction
depth 2, but not at transaction depth 1.
III. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
This section presents the dependency analysis technique, the
heuristic symbolic engine and the design of MPro in depth.
A. Data Dependency Analysis
The key observation of this paper is that at least one
state variable dependency is necessary between a sequence
of function calls in order to cause a depth-n vulnerability.
As one transaction (function call) completes, changes to local
variables (stored on the stack and in memory) are discarded
and only state variables changes will be reflected in the
following transactions, because they are located in persistent
storage. In other words, a smart contract does not contain
depth-n vulnerabilities if no state variable dependency exists.
Furthermore, we investigated the eleven pre-defined security
analysis modules of Mythril-Classic and found that all the
depth-n vulnerabilities that can be detected by Mythril-Classic
are caused by Read After Write (RAW) function dependencies
of a smart contract.
To implement data dependency analysis in MPro we use
Slither, because it provides convenient APIs to instantly ana-
lyze variable usages in each function of the smart contract [11].
Slither is a highly scalable static analysis tool which analyzes
a smart contract source code at the intermediate representation
SlithIR level. In this paper, we use a slightly modified version
of Slither to analyze the state variable usage in every function
of the target smart contract. Based on the state variable usage
returned by Slither, we determine the prioritized transaction
sequences in the following manner:
1) For every externally accessible function f in the given
contract, find all the state variables read in f.
2) For every state variable v that is read in function f, find
all the functions in the given contract that write to the
state variable.
The RAW dependency is therefore determined for function f.
The function dependency information is stored in a dictionary,
where the key is every externally accessible function and the
value is a set of corresponding functions that the key function
depends on. Note that a function can have RAW dependency to
itself if a state variable is both read and written in the function.
B. Mythril-Classic Workflow
Both Mythril-Classic and MPro consist of two main com-
ponents: (1) the symbolic execution engine and (2) the eleven
predefined security analysis modules. One or more smart con-
tract security properties are encapsulated in each of those anal-
ysis modules. At a high-level, the tool first invokes its symbolic
execution engine, executes the target contract symbolically and
produces: an execution tree representing all possible program
states, execution paths and constraints. During the symbolic
execution, the executed program states and constraints are
passed to the security analysis modules when necessary. The
generated path constraints and the negation of security prop-
erty constraints of a security module are together solved by
the Z3 SMT solver. A violation of the safety property (i.e. a
vulnerability) is reported if the overall constraint is satisfiable.
The details of security analysis modules are not specifically
explained in this paper as MPro does not enhance the security
analysis modules of Mythril-Classic.
C. Original Mythril-Classic Symbolic Engine
Since the visualization of full execution trees would not fit
on one page (such that it is still readable), Figure 3 shows
0 PUSH1 0X80
2 PUSH1 0X40
4 MSTORE
5 PUSH1 0X0a
7 PUSH 1 0X00
9 SSTORE
10 PUSH1 0X00
12 PUSH1 0X01
14 SSTORE
15 CALLVALUE
16 DUP1
17 ISZERO
18 PUSH2 0X001a
21 JUMPI
22 PUSH1 0X00
24 DUP1
25 REVERT
26 JUMPDEST
27 POP
28 PUSH2 0x01e2
31 DUP1
32 PUSH2 0x002a
35 PUSH1 0x00
37 CODECOPY
38 PUSH1 0x00
40 RETURN
0 PUSH1 0X80
2 PUSH1 0X40
4 MSTORE
5 PUSH1 0X04
7 CALLDATASIZE
8 LT
9 PUSH2 0X0078
12 JUMPI
call_value1 == 0
Not(call_value1 == 0)
Fig. 3. Partial execution tree generated by Mythril-Classic
an example of a execution sub-tree generated by Mythril-
Classic. Each node consists of consecutive EVM opcodes
[8], representing a basic block of the program. A node
may end with a termination instruction (i.e. RETURN, STOP,
REVERT, ASSERT_FAIL, SUICIDE) or a jump instruction
(i.e. JUMPI, JUMP). Each instruction in a node, in essence,
represents a state change of the smart contract. Every node
is associated with a pointer to the next basic code block
(except for termination instructions) and therefore a path is
constructed. Every path carries a path constraint showing the
reachability of the state. All the previous executed program
states are cached. When executing a new opcode, the previous
program state is retrieved and a new program state is deter-
mined based on the previous state and the current instruction.
The modified new states are then pushed back to the cache
and will be served as the initial states for the next instruction
execution.
To detect a depth-n vulnerability, Mythril-Classic leverages
brute force (with a basic path pruning strategy) to model all
possible transaction sequences. To be more specific, the sym-
bolic engine takes every end state of the previous transaction
as an initial state to the next transaction and continues the
next symbolic execution iteration. Mythril-Classic uses two
types of path pruning techniques and the follow-up transaction
execution is pruned if either:
1) The end state of the previous transaction is terminated
with either the REVERT opcode (which means all the
program state changes are reverted) or the SUICIDE
opcode (which means the smart contract is no longer
alive on blockchain).
2) There is no write to the persistent storage of the smart
contract in the previous transaction (as the state persis-
tent storage remains the same).
However, these techniques are not sufficient to mitigate the
combinatorial explosion issue of Mythril-Classic when faced
with smart contracts with many functions that can be called
in several different orders to form a myriad of possible
transaction sequences.
Solidity  
Source Code Slither
Slither-Mythril 
Interface 
Mythril-Classic + Heuristic Symbolic Engine
State Variable Dependency
Function Dependency
Vulnerability
Report
M-Pro
Fig. 4. MPro Architecture
D. MPro Heuristic Symbolic Engine
The heuristic symbolic engine of MPro is built on top
of the original symbolic engine in Mythril-Classic, providing
additional features to prune unnecessary execution paths (func-
tion sequences) while preserving the original path pruning
techniques. Our heuristic symbolic engine does not modify the
execution of code blocks inside a function. Instead it guides
the path branching to the next function in the corresponding
dependency list (computed by Slither) when the previous
function terminates, and skips unnecessary path generation.
The MPro heuristic symbolic engine works in 4 steps:
1) Invoke the Mythril-Slither interface, retrieve and store
the RAW function dependencies in a look-up table.
2) Use the original Mythril-Classic symbolic execution
engine, symbolically executes all the functions to call
depth 1.
3) For all terminating states at call depth 1, mark the state
as the starting state for the next transaction only if the
function in the previous transaction is in the set of keys
of the look-up table, which means the function in the
previous transaction has a RAW dependency to at least
another function.
4) When determining the function call in the next transac-
tion, look-up the dependency list, guiding the original
symbolic engine to execute the desired branch that exe-
cutes the function call in the next transaction depending
on the previous transaction and skips other branches.
E. Design of MPro
Figure 4 illustrates the work flow of MPro. It takes a
smart contract source code (in Solidity) as input to Slither
and Mythril-Classic. Slither first statically analyzes the state
variable usages in the given smart contract and then passes the
usage information to the Mythril-Slither interface, where the
RAW function dependency is analyzed.
The original solidity source code and the dependency
information are then taken as inputs to MPro’s heuristic
symbolic execution engine. The engine executes the function
combinations in a determined sequence based on the given
dependency information. The heuristic symbolic engine in
MPro is constantly guided along the path to execute the
function combinations that have RAW dependency. Other paths
are treated as unnecessary function sequences and are therefore
pruned from the search space.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We evaluated the performance and the vulnerability reports
of MPro and Mythril-Classic v0.20.0 (the latest version of
Mythril-Classic at the time writing the paper) on 4 Microsoft
Azure Standard D2s v3 instances, each with 2 virtual CPUs
and 8 GB memory. We used solc v0.4.25 and solc v0.5.4 for the
smart contracts that require version 0.4 and 0.5 of the compiler
respectively. The constraint solver used is Z3 v4.8.4..
We evaluate MPro and Mythril-Classic on 2 datasets: (1)
the SWC test suite [15] with 102 simple smart contract that
contains vulnerabilities (and some fixes) and 100 real-world
smart contracts with an average of 258.76 LOC. The set of
real-world contracts was constructed in the following way:
32 contracts were submitted (for a fee) to the Quantstamp
Smart Contract Scanning protocol2. The remaining 68 smart
contracts from our dataset were taken from the Ethereum
Mainnet and Ropsten as the latest deployed contracts at the
time when we collected our dataset (i.e. end of January 2019),
with the condition that their source code is available and
unique in our dataset.
The goals of our measurement are: (1) to validate that the
vulnerability reports of MPro and Mythril-Classic are identical
and (2) that MPro is more efficient than Mythril-Classic.
B. Security
As the security analysis modules of MPro remain the
same as Mythril-Classic, we did not specifically check false
positives or false negatives of the issues detected by either
MPro or Mythril-Classic. This is not in the scope of this
paper. Instead, we examined the vulnerability reports of MPro
for both datasets and validated that MPro produces identical
vulnerability reports as Mythril-Classic at depth 1, 2 and 3,
given no timeout after which the tools would be stopped.
We note that if a timeout (e.g. 30 minutes) was used for
MPro and Mythril-Classic, then MPro was able to detect
more vulnerabilities for some contracts, than Mythril-Classic
at depths 2 and 3. More details are shown in the next section.
In terms of the security evaluation for this paper we can say
that MPro is at least as good as Mythril-Classic. We leave the
improvement of the security capabilities of Mythril-Classic for
future work.
C. Performance
We measure the performances of MPro and Mythril-Classic
with the 100 randomly chosen real-world smart contracts. The
performance evaluation of the SWC test suite is skipped as the
test cases in SWC test suite use the minimum amount of code
2https://quantstamp.com/
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON (DEPTH 2)
Timeout MPro Mythril-Classic Speedup
Avg. time(s) T-out Avg. time(s) T-out
10-min 116 8 167 17 1.61x
30-min 182 3 309 5 2.04x
none 176 0 301 2 1.92x
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON (DEPTH 3)
Timeout MPro Mythril-Classic Speedup
Avg. time(s) T-out Avg. time(s) T-out
120-min 856 12 1262 20 2.89x
to showcase a specific kind of vulnerability, they are not real-
world contracts.
a) Overall Speedup and Timeouts: We measured the
performance of the two tools with and without a timeout at
depths 1, 2 and 3. At depth-1 both tools have approximately
the same performance, minus a small delta needed by MPro
to run the data dependency analysis. However, it would be
a trivial optimization to exclude this analysis if the user is
interested only in depth-1.
At depth-2 we used timeouts of 10- and 30-minutes and
noticed that 9 and 3 more programs respectively timed-out
in Mythril-Classic than in MPro, where 8 and 5 programs
respectively timed-out. Table I summarizes the performance
comparison between MPro and Mythril-Classic at depth 2.
On average, MPro almost reaches a 2x speedup comparing
to Mythril-Classic with no timeout. Given a timeout of 10
minutes, the speedup is lower because the execution time of
the timed-out instances is capped at 10 minutes. However,
given this 10 minutes timeout, more than double the number
of programs timeout in Mythril-Classic, in comparison to
MPro. In addition, 2 instances are killed by the operating
system when running Mythril-Classic with no timeout, due to
memory restriction. The same 2 instances finish successfully
in MPro, because of our path pruning strategy which leads to
less memory usage.
At depth-3 we used a higher timeout of 120-minutes to
be fair, and we noticed that 8 more programs timed-out in
Mythril-Classic than MPro, where 12 out of 100 programs
timed-out. Table II summarizes the performances comparisons
at depth 3, where we can see that at depth-3 the speedup
of MPro w.r.t. Mythril-Classic is almost 3x. Similarly, to
the observation for depth-2, given a timeout, the speedup is
lower, however, the number of timed-out instances for Mythril-
Classic is almost double that of MPro. We stop the evaluation
at depth 3 as no depth-3 vulnerability is detected by either tool
for our dataset. Note that we do not report the average time
at depth-3 for the analysis with no timeout, because we ran
the 20 programs that timed out on Mythril-Classic for over
2 days, before manually stopping the analysis process. Hence
we cannot accurately compute the speedup when there is no
timeout, but we not that it would likely be even higher than
TABLE III
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON CATEGORIZED BY COMPLEXITY
Depth Exec. Time MPro (s) Mythril-Classic (s) Speedup
2 t ≤ 10 mins 52 79 1.40x
2 t ≥ 10 mins 783 1383 4.45x
3 t ≤ 10 mins 94 125 1.78x
3 t ≥ 10 mins 1206 3087 6.51x
2.89x that was recorder for a timeout of 120 minutes.
b) Speedup Correlated with Smart Contract Complexity:
We further investigate the test cases that the performance of
MPro particularly dominates Mythril-Classic at depth 2 and
3. We put the test cases into two categories: the test cases
that finish between 0 to 10 minute in Mythril-Classic, the
test cases that take more than 10 minutes to finish. Table III
shows the the speedup of MPro of the two categories. As the
complexity of the smart contract increases (indicated by the
overall runtime of Mythril-Classic), the MPro speedup reaches
4.45x at depth 2 and 6.51x at depth 3, with test cases that take
more than 10 minutes to finish in Mythril-Classic. This trend
is expected to continue, i.e. the more complex a smart contract
is, the bigger overall execution tree, hence more of the search
space can be pruned by the data dependency analysis in MPro.
c) Number of Solved Instances: In addition to the per-
formance speedup, we also measure the advantage of MPro
in terms of the number of instances solved in a certain
amount of time. Specifically, we sampled the number of test
cases from the 100 real-world test suite that finish in 60,
180, 300, 600 and 1800 seconds in both tools. Figure 5
demonstrates such comparison at depth 2 where the x-axis is
the number of instance solved from the 100 randomly chosen
smart contract test suit and the y-axis is the time period. As
shown in the graph, MPro has an absolute advantage over
Mythril-Classic where MPro is able to solve 10%, 17.14%,
8.75%, 9.52% and 5.56% more instances than Mythril-Classic
at the corresponding sampling point. Similarly, we record
the number of solved instances at depth 3 for both tools at
600, 1800, 3600 and 7200 seconds threshold respectively, and
MPro is able to solve 19.67%, 6.57%, 8.97% and 8.75% more
instances than Mythril-Classic as shown in Figure 6.
V. LIMITATIONS
Limitations. MPro has several limitations which we describe
in this section. First, the data dependency analysis of Slither is
not control-flow sensitive. Specifically, Slither simply reports
all the state variables that show up in a function. However,
some state variable may not be actually reachable. This may
lead to an imprecise function dependency analysis in MPro and
hence non-dependent function combinations during symbolic
execution. Fixing this limitation would require adopting a
more precise static analysis technique, which we intend to
pursue in future work.
Second, MPro does not optimize the intra-procedural sym-
bolic execution of the functions in smart contracts, but only
heuristically prunes unnecessary follow-up functions. Accord-
ing to the performance evaluation of MPro, we believe that
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there is still room for improvement since there are still some
real-world smart contracts that time out in 30 or 120 minutes
in MPro. We intend to address this issue in future work.
Finally, since MPro uses Slither for the data dependency
analysis it requires the source code of the smart contract as
input. This limitation will be eliminated in future work by
employing a data dependency analysis technique directly on
the smart contract bytecode.
VI. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present related smart contract analyzers.
Since in this paper we mainly focus on performance opti-
mization and not on detecting more types of vulnerabilities
or reducing false positives, we limited our evaluation to a
comparison with Mythril-Classic. A direct comparison of the
performance of the following tools and MPro is not valid,
because they detect different types of vulnerabilities.
Maian [10] (no longer being maintained) is a symbolic
analyzer for smart contracts which is able to model multiple
transactions of a smart contact. The Maian team first defined
a formal and systematic characterization of trace vulnera-
bilities. By leveraging concolic analysis, Maian initializes
partial program states with concrete values, which makes
the project scalable to analyze real world smart contract to
some extent. To further increase scalability, Maian utilizes
basic static analysis to filter out unnecessary symbolic engine
usage. Maian is can detect only 3 vulnerable patterns: Greedy,
Prodigal, and Suicidal.
Securify is a fully automated and static Ethereum smart
contract analyzer. Securify defines two kinds of patterns for a
security property: compliance patterns, which implies the sat-
isfaction of the property, and violation patterns, which implies
its negation [17]. Thanks to the patterns, the tool is able to
produce some definite violations of given security properties,
which reduces the manual effort required to verify the issue
detected. Securify provides 7 built-in security properties and
corresponding compliance/violation patterns like ”no write
after call”, ”restricted write” and ”restricted transfer”.
Zeus [18] is a sound and scalable framework for automated
formal verification of smart contracts based on abstract in-
terpretation and model checking. Zeus classifies the issues
in smart contracts into two categories: correctness issues and
fairness issues. Zeus analyzes the input smart contract at a low-
level intermediate representation and allows users to customize
the correctness/fairness criteria in a given template.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented MPro, a fully automated and scalable
security scanning tool for Ethereum smart contracts and we
offer it as free open source software. The tool is developed
based on Mythril-Classic and Slither, leveraging both static
and symbolic analysis to prune unnecessary execution paths.
We have evaluated the efficiency of MPro and compared it
to Mythil-Classic using a dataset of 100 real-world smart
contracts that we compiled ourselves and which we also offer
to the general public. From our experimental observations
MPro is on average n times more efficient than Mythril-
Classic, while preserving all the detection capabilities of
Mythril-Classic, when detecting depth-n vulnerabilities.
Future Work. Going further, we propose two major im-
provements of MPro: (i) to develop a Slither-driven targeted
symbolic mechanism [16] based on the MPro heuristic sym-
bolic engine, and (ii) to parallelize the symbolic execution
and security analysis processes of Mythril-Classic, to further
improve the performance of MPro. Since the calculation of a
concrete input to validate the detected vulnerability is the main
limitation of static tools like Slither, we plan to solve this
problem by implementing a more sophisticated mechanism
which further combines static analysis with a symbolic engine.
In the Slither-driven targeted symbolic execution mechanism,
MPro is aimed at generating test cases to prove the presence
of exploitable vulnerabilities by targeting the warnings flagged
by Slither. The general idea is to guide the symbolic execution
engine in MPro along all the branches that are more likely to
hit a target vulnerable state flagged by Slither. The potential
vulnerability is proved if a concrete input can be returned by
the symbolic engine and the constraint solver. Otherwise, the
detected issue can be classified as a false positive.
Since the current version of MPro only guides the branches
to the next dependent transaction, this improvement can be
treated as a technique to further prune search spaces on top of
MPro. Ideally all other paths, that do not lead to any error, can
be avoided. As Slither is efficient and a single path generation
is cheap, this mechanism is expected to be more efficient.
In addition, the analyses of both Mythril-Classic and MPro
are sequential. While invoking multiple instances of a sym-
bolic engine to parallelize constructing the one overall exe-
cution tree often leads to redundancies, it is feasible to split
the overall execution tree into multiple sub trees by the initial
function calls. Each tree holds only one initial function call
and its dependents. The parallel execution of such independent
sub trees is relatively easy.
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